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In rE MIgUEL M.
 Like the attorney-client privilege, the doctor-patient relationship is built on trust 
and privacy.1 Patients entrust physicians with private information about their health 
and personal lives. Doctors, in turn, are expected to maintain confidentiality and 
keep patients’ records private. only in the most extenuating circumstances is medical 
information permitted to be released without authorization to third parties.2 Yet, 
despite explicit statutory protections governing the privacy of medical information, 
exceptions exist under which doctors and hospitals can disclose information without 
a patient’s knowledge, consent, or authorization.3 the dividing line between 
unauthorized and authorized disclosure of private medical information, therefore, 
often rests on precise interpretations of law and legislative intent. When a court 
ignores precedent and legislative intent, the privacy protections on which patients 
rely can be circumvented.
 in In re Miguel M., the new York state appellate Division, second Department, 
affirmed a lower court decision holding that a physician may obtain a patient’s 
clinical records from outside medical facilities without the patient’s authorization, 
and may then use those records in a legal proceeding to order treatment for the 
patient.4 in affirming the lower court, the second Department utilized an 
unprecedented interpretation of the term “public health” to justify what should have 
been an unauthorized inter-hospital transfer of a patient’s medical records. the 
holding allowed the second Department to sidestep federal statutory privacy 
requirements and dodge a potential federal supremacy challenge. this case comment 
contends that the second Department’s interpretation of “public health” was overly 
broad, not supported by precedent, and threatens to weaken federal statutory patient 
privacy protections.
 Dr. Charles Barron, Director of the Department of Psychiatry at elmhurst 
hospital Center,5 sought a court order authorizing assisted outpatient treatment 
(aot) for his patient, Miguel M.6 aot is an umbrella term for various outpatient 
mental health services intended to help “treat [a patient’s] mental illness and to assist 
the person in living and functioning in the community, or to attempt to prevent a 
1. See generally Richard a. Lord, 23 Williston on Contracts § 62:12 (4th ed. 2010).
2. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rules, U.s. Dep’t of health & human servs. 7 (2003), http://www.
hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf. For example, health care 
providers may disclose certain protected health information regarding victims of abuse, neglect, or 
domestic violence. Id.
3. Id. an exception exists, for example, for providers to release certain health information through an order 
from a court or administrative tribunal. Id.
4. 882 n.Y.s.2d 698, 706 (2d Dep’t 2009). the clinical treatment involved in this case was assisted 
outpatient treatment (aot). See infra text accompanying notes 7–8. aot is defined as “categories of 
outpatient services which have been ordered by the court pursuant to this section.” n.Y. Mental hyg. 
Law § 9.60 (a)(1) (McKinney 2005).
5. elmhurst hospital Center is a 545-bed facility in elmhurst, Queens. Elmhurst Hospital Center, nYC.
Gov, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hhc/ehc/html/home/home.shtml (last visited oct. 18, 2010). Psychiatric 
services are among the Center’s offerings. Id.
6. Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 700.
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relapse.”7 examples of aot care include the provision of medication, blood and 
urine testing, individual or group therapy, and educational and vocational training.8 
Patients involved in aot proceedings usually remain anonymous to the court and, 
other than details of two prior hospitalizations, published records do not further 
describe “Miguel M.”9 When a medical provider such as Dr. Barron believes that a 
patient requires this form of outpatient treatment, he or she can seek a court order 
mandating aot care.10 section 9.60 of new York Mental hygiene Law,11 also 
known as “Kendra’s Law,”12 sets forth the criteria by which an individual may be 
ordered by a court to undergo aot.
[a] person may be ordered to receive assisted outpatient treatment if the court 
finds that such person: (1) is eighteen years of age or older; and (2) is suffering 
from a mental illness; and (3) is unlikely to survive safely in the community 
without supervision, based on a clinical determination; and (4) has a history 
of lack of compliance with treatment for mental illness.13
 at the hearing seeking an order to provide aot to Miguel M., Dr. Barron 
presented supporting testimony from Dr. Daniel Garza, Director of aot at 
elmhurst hospital.14 During direct testimony, Dr. Garza stated that, among his 
duties at elmhurst, “he investigate[d] and evaluate[d] referrals to [the hospital’s] 
aot program.”15 Dr. Garza explained that he had recently diagnosed Miguel M. 
with schizoaffective disorder.16 the basis for Dr. Garza’s diagnosis included a review 
of clinical records from holliswood hospital, a facility which had previously treated 
Miguel M.17 When asked how he came into possession of Miguel M.’s records from 
holliswood, Dr. Garza replied: “as part of the investigatory process under aot, the 
7. Mental hyg. § 9.60(a)(1). 
8. Id.
9. Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 700.
10. Dr. Barron sought the order for treatment from the new York supreme Court, Queens County, pursuant 
to Mental hyg. § 9.60(e)(1)(iii).
11. Mental hyg. § 9.60(c). 
12. s.B. 5762, 222nd Leg., 1999th Reg. sess. (n.Y. 1999). Kendra’s Law is named after Kendra Webdale 
who, on January 3, 1999, was “pushed to her death before an oncoming subway train by a man diagnosed 
with paranoid schizophrenia who had neglected to take his prescribed medication.” In re K.L., 1 n.Y.3d 
362, 366 (2004). the new York state legislature responded to Webdale’s death by enacting section 9.60 
of the new York Mental hygiene Law. Mental hyg. § 9.60; s.B. 5762, 222nd Leg., 1999th Reg. sess. 
(n.Y. 1999).
13. Mental hyg. § 9.60(c).
14. In re Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 700.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 700; am. Psychiatric ass’n, Diagnostic & statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
298 (4th ed. 2000) (describing schizoaffective disorder as “a disorder in which a mood episode and the 
active phase of schizophrenia occurs together”).
17. Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 700. holliswood hospital is a 125-bed private psychiatric hospital located 
in Queens, new York. the holliswood hospital, http://www.holliswoodhospital.com (last visited 
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office requests records from institutions that have treated the individuals under such 
investigations. We received these records [upon] a request for [Miguel M.’s records] 
and the hospitalizations in question.”18 Dr. Barron claimed that Dr. Garza was 
entitled to obtain Miguel M.’s records under new York Mental hygiene Law section 
33.13(c)(12), which states that “information about patients or clients . . . shall not be 
released by the offices or its facilities to any person or agency outside of the offices 
except . . . to a director of community services [for the mentally disabled] . . . in the 
exercise of his or her statutory functions, powers and duties.”19
 Miguel M. moved to preclude admission of the clinical records on the ground 
that they were obtained from holliswood without his authorization under the federal 
health information Portability and accountability act (hiPaa).20 hiPaa, 
according to Miguel M., preempted those portions of the new York Mental hygiene 
Law concerning aot investigations.21 the state law, he alleged, “is both contrary 
to and less stringent than hiPaa regulations since it authorizes the disclosure of a 
subject individual’s clinical records without either a court order or the subject 
individual’s authorization.”22 Moreover, he argued, hiPaa’s Privacy Rule sets a 
constitutional “f loor of federal privacy protections whereby state laws that are 
‘contrary’ to the Privacy Rule are preempted unless a specific exception applies.”23 
the trial court denied Miguel M.’s motion, admitted the records, and ordered Miguel 
M. to undergo aot.24
 Miguel M. appealed, arguing that the unauthorized transfer of records from 
holliswood to the provider psychiatrist at elmhurst violated hiPaa.25 Miguel M. 
claimed that, although the Mental hygiene Law permitted Dr. Garza to obtain his 
records without a court order or patient authorization, federal preemption of state 
law proscribed the transfer. specifically, Miguel M. argued that hiPaa preempted 
portions of the state law concerning aot investigations and prohibited unauthorized 
disclosure.26 thus, according to Miguel M., before Dr. Garza could lawfully obtain 
hospital records, “he was required to comply with the hiPaa Privacy Rule by 
obtaining either a court order or a hiPaa-compliant authorization executed by 
Miguel M.”27
oct. 18, 2010). therapeutic programs for patients with a “broad range of psychiatric diagnoses” are 
among its services. Id.
18. Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 700.
19. n.Y. Mental hyg. Law § 33.13(c)(12) (McKinney 2005).
20. Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 700.
21. Id. at 701.
22. Id. at 705.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 702.
25. Id. at 699–700.
26. Id. at 701.
27. Id.
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 the second Department affirmed the lower court’s order for aot, basing its 
decision on multiple grounds.28 each of the court’s arguments were based on an 
unprecedented interpretation of the term “public health.”29 First, the court held that 
hiPaa itself authorized disclosures of “protected health information” to “[a] public 
health authority” for the conduct of “public health investigations . . . and public health 
interventions.”30 second, the court stated that even if hiPaa did not authorize 
disclosure, Miguel M.’s argument still failed because “hiPaa specifically excepts 
from the scope of its preemption provision . . . circumstances in which [t]he provision 
of state law . . . provides for the reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, or 
death, or for the conduct of public health surveillance, investigation[s], or 
intervention[s].”31
 the court’s determination that an aot investigation is considered a “public 
health investigation” or “intervention” is legally f lawed for two reasons. First, the 
court ignored one of the fundamental goals of hiPaa: while recognizing a need to 
improve the nation’s health care system through greater accessibility of information, 
federal—and, by implication, state—regulations must still adhere to a core principle 
of privacy.32 second, no other jurisdiction has ever applied the public health hiPaa 
exception to the health and well-being of an individual.33 in doing so, the court has 
cleared a path for health care providers to potentially sidestep hiPaa’s privacy goals 
through a broadened meaning of the public health exception to include evaluation of 
individuals. the public health exception should have been interpreted as limited to 
systematic health investigations and interventions at the population or community 
level, rather than clinician requests at the individual level.
 the second Department justified its decision to uphold the transfer of Miguel 
M.’s medical records on two grounds. First, the court held that, under hiPaa, 
aot qualified as a public health investigation and public health intervention, thus 
triggering a hiPaa exception.34 Because of this exception, according to the court, 
the hospitals did not require authorization to transfer Miguel M.’s patient records. 
second, the court held that, even if hiPaa did not authorize disclosure under this 
28. Id. at 703–06.
29. Id. at 705–06.
30. Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 706 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
32. h.R. Rep. no. 104-736, at 60 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.s.C.C.a.n. 1990 (“such 
guidelines shall include procedures to assure that such information is provided and utilized in a manner 
that appropriately protects the confidentiality of the information and the privacy of individuals receiving 
health care services and items.”).
33. Multiple electronic searches of published legal decisions including “hiPaa” and “public health” yielded 
no published federal or state cases regarding similar exceptions.
34. Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 705.
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exception, the federal statute did not preempt state law.35 therefore, according to the 
court, any constitutional challenge under the supremacy Clause must fail.36
 the second Department began its qualification analysis by correctly noting that 
hiPaa did not offer a controlling statutory definition for a public health investigation 
or intervention.37 however, instead of defining the terms or looking to other 
jurisdictions for clarification, the court proposed its own two criteria by which an 
aot investigation qualified as a public health investigation.38 First, the court held 
that Kendra’s Law, under which Dr. Barron sought the original court order, had a 
public health purpose.39 the court noted that “Kendra’s Law was adopted to . . . 
enable mentally ill persons to lead more productive and satisfying lives, while at the 
same time reducing the risk of violence posed by mentally ill patients” to the public.40 
second, the court stated that an aot investigation was “in accordance with the 
state’s police and parens patriae powers” to protect its citizens.41 thus, the Miguel M. 
court interpreted a public health investigation to mean any action that protects the 
safety and health of the public, even if it is directed at an individual rather than at 
the public at large. While public safety is a noble goal, this interpretation of public 
health is simply inaccurate; such a definition is not an appropriate application in this 
case, not the meaning ascribed to the phrase by other jurisdictions, and not in 
accordance with the intent of hiPaa.
 the second Department stated that, in the absence of a “controlling statutory 
definition,” it would first “construe words and phrases in accordance with their plain, 
ordinary, [and] functional meanings.”42 however, although several definitions of 
public health were available, nowhere in its decision does the court construe or cite 
any meaning for public health, public health investigation, or public health 
intervention—the critical terms on which the case hinged.
 Use of the term dates back to at least 1920, when author and Yale University 
“founder of public health,” Charles-edward amory Winslow, emphasized the 
organizational nature of the term.43 Winslow defined public health as “the science 
and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the 
organized efforts and informed choices of society, organizations, public and private, 
35. Id.
36. Id. at 705–06.
37. Id. at 704.
38. Id. at 704–05.
39. Id. at 704.
40. In re K.L., 1 n.Y.3d 362, 367 (2004) (quoting 1999 n.Y. Laws 408 § 2).
41. Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 704–05.
42. Id. at 704.
43. See C.e.a. Winslow, The Untilled Fields of Public Health, 51 science Mag., Jan. 9, 1920, at 23, 30 
(defining the term “public health”). in 1915, Winslow became the first “Chairman in Public health” at 
the Yale school of Medicine. Further information about Winslow and his work at Yale is available at 
Our History, Yale sch. of Pub. health, http://publichealth.yale.edu/about/history/history.aspx (last 
visited oct. 18, 2010).
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communities and individuals.”44 today, the community-based goals of public health 
are highlighted in the two definitions in Black’s Law Dictionary: “1. the health of 
the community at large; [and] 2. the healthful or sanitary condition of the general 
body of people or the community en masse; esp., the methods of maintaining the 
health of the community, as by preventive medicine and organized care for the sick.”45 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the agency for toxic substances 
and Disease Registry commonly define “public health surveillance” as “the ongoing 
systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of outcome-specific data for use in 
the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health practice.”46
 other sources of guidance were also available to the court. For example, while 
there is no applicable statutory definition of public health in new York, state case law 
provides a single published example of a public health intervention: the closing of 
new York City public bath houses to stop the spread of hiV.47 in City of New York v. 
New St. Mark’s Baths, the new York state Public health Council, with the approval 
of the state’s Commissioner of health, adopted an emergency resolution authorizing 
city officials to close any facilities “in which high risk sexual activity [took] place.”48 
the Council based its recommendation on the Commissioner’s findings that 
“[a]ppropriate public health intervention . . . is essential to interrupting the epidemic 
[of aiDs] among the people of the state of new York.”49 thus, in the state’s lone 
relevant legal precedent, a public health intervention describes measures taken by a 
city of over seven million people50 to halt an epidemic that was resulting in almost 
two hundred new cases a month of a disease with a fatality rate of “nearly 85%,” and 
for which “effective treatment [was] wholly lacking.”51 this use of public health 
intervention is distinguishable from, and hardly applicable to, ordering aot for a 
single individual.
 Given the absence of controlling statutory guidance in new York, the court should 
have looked to other states in order to appropriately clarify undefined terms. Both 
extra-jurisdictional statutory law and case law offer persuasive guidance as to the 
meaning of public health. First, extra-jurisdictional statutes are strongly suggestive as 
to how other states interpret the “plain, ordinary, [and] functional” meanings of the 
44. Winslow, supra note 43, at 30.
45. Black’s Law Dictionary 787 (9th ed. 2009).
46. stephen B. thacker, Historical Development, in Principles and Practice of Public health 
surveillance 1 (steven M. teutsch & R. elliott Churchill eds., 2d ed., 2000). 
47. City of new York v. new st. Mark’s Baths, 497 n.Y.s.2d 979 (sup. Ct. n.Y. County 1986).
48. Id. at 913.
49. Id. at 913–14 (emphasis added).
50. according to U.s. Census Bureau statistics, the population of new York City was 7,071,639 in 1980 and 
7,322,564 in 1990. Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1980, U.s. Census Bureau (June 15, 
1998), http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab21.txt; Population of the 
100 Largest Urban Places: 1990, U.s. Census Bureau (June 15, 1998), http://www.census.gov/
population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab22.txt.
51. New St. Mark’s Baths, 497 n.Y.s.2d at 980.
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various terms. For example, when discussing confidentiality of public health 
investigations, Louisiana defines threats to public health as nuisances “including but 
not limited to communicable, contagious, and infectious diseases, as well as illnesses, 
diseases, and genetic disorders or abnormalities.”52 north Carolina defines public 
health investigations as the “surveillance of an illness, condition, or symptoms that 
may indicate the existence of a communicable disease or condition.”53
 Case law from other jurisdictions is also instructive. in Ruiz v. Johnson, the U.s. 
District Court for the southern District of texas reviewed a complaint involving 
alleged unconstitutional practices and conditions in the texas prison system.54 
evidence included testimony from Dr. steven Jenison, the Physician administrator 
of the infectious Diseases Bureau, Public health Division, at the new Mexico 
Department of health.55 Dr. Jenison argued for a public health intervention to 
determine whether an inmate with tuberculosis had exposed and infected other 
prisoners.56 in his testimony, Dr. Jenison stated that prior reviews of prisoner deaths 
in the facility included an investigation of seventy-two fatalities from hiV-related 
complications, potentially including tuberculosis contracted from others within the 
prison population.57
 in Hannis v. Sacred Heart Hospital, the plaintiff-parents appealed a lower court 
order denying their motion to compel the local health bureau to produce the names 
of possible class members in connection with a class action negligence suit.58 the 
potential class consisted of individuals who may have been exposed to infectious 
tuberculosis by a doctor who had treated them. the parents claimed that a doctor 
who had treated their children knew or should have known that he had the illness.59 
the Bureau of health argued that the information sought—persons identified by 
the Bureau as having been exposed to the infectious doctor, the results of medical 
tests, and details regarding the coordination of their medical treatment—was 
obtained and maintained as a result of a public health investigation and was, therefore, 
confidential.60 in its decision to uphold the privacy of the information, the court 
cited the Bureau’s investigatory work as part of its mission to “prevent and control 
communicable diseases.”61
 in both Ruiz and Hannis, as well as in numerous cases from other jurisdictions, 
public health intervention and public health investigation describe population-based 
52. La. Rev. stat. ann. § 40:3.1 (2001).
53. n.C. Gen. stat. § 130a-141.1(a) (2010).
54. 37 F. supp.2d 855, 860 (s.D. tex. 1999).
55. Id. at 896.
56. Id. at 897.
57. Id. at 896.
58. 789 a.2d 368, 370 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 371.
61. Id. at 372.
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measures taken by a municipal agency in order to oversee the health of numerous 
citizens. the available public health investigations or interventions were either 
conducted by municipal public health departments or were aimed at the health of a 
community.62 thus, established case law in new York and elsewhere underscores the 
definition of public health investigations and public health interventions as 
population-based practices, rather than interventions at the individual level. in short, 
the Miguel M. court’s unique interpretation was not plain, ordinary, or functional.
 in addition to using the “plain, ordinary, [and] functional meanings” of public 
health and its relative terms, the court also stated it would “[interpret] those terms 
under hiPaa . . . to effectuate the legislative intent.”63 again, the court strayed 
from its stated course and from Congress’s intent in passing hiPaa. First, Congress’s 
intent was never to include the sharing of clinical records in the name of a private 
investigation in order to determine whether or not to provide treatment for a single 
individual.64 When Congress enacted hiPaa in 1996, its goal was “to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the [nation’s] health care system.”65 hiPaa was 
designed to establish the nation’s first set of standards for electronic health care 
transactions and information transfer.66 While Congress’s primary purpose in passing 
hiPaa was to facilitate communication, Congress also recognized that advances in 
technology could endanger the privacy of certain health information.67 indeed, 
hiPaa’s drafters went to great lengths to ensure that the secretary of health and 
62. the “investigations” include: In re att’y Gen. for investigative subpoenas, 766 n.W.2d 675 (Mich. Ct. 
app. 2009) (authorizing the Michigan Department of Community health to subpoena a number of 
patients seen by a psychologist); stobierski v. Walnut hill, inc., no. CV030518847, 2004 Conn. super. 
LeXis 284 (Conn. super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2004) (reliance by plaintiff on public health investigation as 
basis for claims); In re Phillip Morris, inc., 97-2708 (La. app. 4 Cir. 1/28/98); 706 so.2d 665 (a suit 
regarding research performed at a university medical center); Marquez v. turnock, 765 F.supp. 1376 
(C.D. ill. 1991) (a proceeding for falsif ication of records in an illinois Department of health 
investigation); Bomba’s Rest. & Cocktail Lounge, inc. v. Lord de la Warr hotel, inc., 389 a.2d 766 
(Del. 1978) (compliance with a Delaware investigation of a restaurant). the “interventions” include: 
Vance v. t.R.C. 494 s.e.2d 714 (Ga. Ct. app. 1997) (a Georgia response to a herpes outbreak); In re 
stilinovich, 479 n.W.2d 731 (Minn. Ct. app. 1992) (a Minnesota response to an hiV-positive man’s 
intent to spread the virus throughout the community).
63. In re Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d 698, 704 (2d Dep’t 2009). 
64. See, e.g., Keshecki v. st. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 785 n.Y.s.2d 300, 303 (sup. Ct. Richmond County 2004) 
(“hiPaa contains a privacy rule which prevents protected health information . . . by identifiable 
individuals from being disclosed by ‘covered entities’ to others without written consent of the individual 
or the opportunity to formally object.” (emphasis added)). 
65. holzle v. healthcare serv. Grp., inc., no. 110376, 2005 WL 1252597, at *3 (sup. Ct. n.Y. County May 
24, 2005). 
66. See, e.g., ilene n. Moore et. al., Confidentiality and Privacy in Health Care from the Patient’s Perspective: 
Does HIPAA Help?, 17 health Matrix 215, 217–18 (2007).
67. See, e.g., h.R. Rep. no. 104-736, at 270 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.s.C.C.a.n 1865, 1893 
(“[W]ith respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health information . . . [t]he conferees 
recognize that technological innovation with respect to electronic transmission of health-care related 
transactions is progressing rapidly in the marketplace. the conferees do not intend to stif le innovation 
in this area.”).
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human services developed “procedures to assure that the privacy of individuals 
receiving health care services” was “appropriately protected.”68 Congress, therefore, 
incorporated into hiPaa numerous provisions mandating the privacy of individual 
health information.69 sections of the new law pertaining to patient privacy became 
known as the hiPaa Privacy Rule.70 among its ramifications, the Privacy Rule 
prohibits, at a minimum, the transfer of medical records by clinicians absent written 
consent from the patient.71
 Congress understood that there would be situations when, in the health interests 
of the greater population, health care providers should be allowed to disclose private 
health information without the need to obtain authorization from a patient. examples 
include reports of child abuse, investigations into Food and Drug administration-
regulated products, and workplace medical surveillance.72 thus, Congress incorporated 
“non-authorization” exceptions into hiPaa to account for these circumstances.73 if 
conditions trigger one of these exceptions, a health care provider is not required to 
seek a patient’s authorization prior to disclosure of health information.
 another non-authorization hiPaa exception is for “[use] and [disclosure] for 
public health activities.”74 according to this exception, entities permitted to disclose 
protected health information without authorization include:
a public health authority that is authorized by law to collect or receive such 
information for the purpose of preventing or controlling disease, injury, or 
disability, including, but not limited to, the reporting of disease, injury, vital 
events such as birth or death, and the conduct of public health surveillance, 
public health investigations, and public health interventions; or, at the direction 
of a public health authority, to an official of a foreign government agency that 
is acting in collaboration with a public health authority.75
 When it ruled that an aot investigation qualified as a public health investigation, 
the court in Miguel M. effectively circumvented Congress’s explicit legislative intent 
to limit unauthorized disclosure to authorities acting on behalf of community health. 
in addition to its qualification argument, the second Department held that even if 
hiPaa did not directly authorize disclosure, the federal statute did not preempt 
state law and, therefore, Miguel M.’s constitutional challenge under the supremacy 
68. Id. at 77.
69. See, e.g., Paul n. otto, Reasonableness Meets Requirements: Regulating Security and Privacy in Software, 59 
Duke L.J. 309, 325 (2009).
70. Id. at 325–26 (“the Privacy Rule begins by laying out a key guiding principle: the standard restricts uses 
or disclosures of ‘protected health information’ to what is expressly and explicitly authorized by the 
Privacy Rule.”).
71. See Keshecki v. st. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 785 n.Y.s.2d 300, 303 (sup. Ct. n.Y. County 2004).
72. these exceptions are provided for in 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.512(b)(1)(ii)–(v) (2010).
73. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i).
74. Id. § 164.512(b).
75. Id. § 164.512(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
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Clause must fail.76 here again, the court used its novel public health interpretation to 
overcome Miguel M.’s valid argument. the U.s. Constitution provides that federal 
law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,”77 and “vests in Congress the power to 
supersede . . . state statutory or regulatory law . . . .”78 there are three ways in which 
federal law may preempt state law: (1) “express preemption,” where Congress explicitly 
states its intent to preempt state law; (2) “field preemption,” where federal legislation 
is so inclusive that it implies that Congress intended to fully govern the subject 
matter; or (3) “implied conflict preemption,” where “conflicts between federal and 
state laws [exist] or when the state law acts as an obstacle to accomplishing Congress’s 
purpose and objective in enacting the federal legislation.”79 In re Miguel M. involved 
a combination of the first and third forms of preemption.80
 the court began its federal preemption analysis by acknowledging that 
“preemption is a question of legislative intent.”81 nevertheless, the court did not 
adhere to congressional objectives. in fact, the court ignored Congress’s legislative 
goals and sidestepped the constitutional challenge completely. once again, the court’s 
interpretation of public health played a crucial role in its decision. First, hiPaa 
explicitly preempts contrary state law. Under hiPaa’s “General Rule” section, a 
hiPaa “standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted under this 
subchapter that is contrary to a provision of state law preempts the provision of state 
law.”82 however, Congress considered only less protective state privacy laws to be 
“contrary” to hiPaa: state laws that are “more stringent than a [hiPaa] standard, 
requirement, or implementation specification” are explicitly not preempted.83 hiPaa 
thus acts as a “f loor of federal privacy protections.”84 states can provide additional 
protections, according to Congress’s intent, but they cannot provide fewer.85 Because 
Kendra’s Law privacy protections do not rise to the federal “f loor,” it is contrary to 
and expressly preempted by hiPaa.
 Furthermore, Kendra’s Law acts as an obstacle to hiPaa and triggers implied 
conflict preemption. Miguel M. did not dispute that Kendra’s Law allowed disclosure 
76. In re Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d 698, 705 (2d Dep’t 2009).
77. U.s. Const. art. Vi, cl. 2 (“[the] Constitution, and the Laws of the United states which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
states, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any 
thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
78. Guice v. Charles schwab & Co., 89 n.Y.2d 31, 39 (1996).
79. Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 705.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2002).
83. Id. § 160.203(b).
84. arons v. Jutkowitz, 9 n.Y.3d 393, 414 (2007).
85. See, e.g., Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.s. Dep’t of health & human servs. 17 (2003), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf.
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of medical records without authorization.86 Rather, he argued that compliance with 
both hiPaa and Kendra’s Law was impossible because the latter “authorizes the 
disclosure of a subject individual’s clinical records without either a court order or the 
subject individual’s authorization.”87 the state law, Miguel M. contended, thereby 
acted as an obstacle to federal legislation and should defer to hiPaa under implied 
conflict preemption.
 the court negated these challenges by applying its misguided interpretation of 
public health to hiPaa’s scope of preemption. hiPaa preemption includes an 
exception for circumstances where “[s]tate law . . . provides for the reporting of 
disease or injury, child abuse, birth or death, or for the conduct of public health 
surveillance, investigation, or intervention.”88 thus, state laws that provide for this 
type of reporting are exempt from hiPaa’s authorization requirements. according 
to the court, because the aot hearing qualified as a public health investigation and 
intervention, the action fell under an exception, and hiPaa’s scope of preemption 
did not apply. the court reasoned that hiPaa did not preempt Kendra’s Law under 
express or implied conflict preemption and, as a result, Miguel M.’s constitutional 
challenge was moot. By ruling that an aot investigation is a public health 
investigation, the court used hiPaa to defeat congressional intent and the federal 
law itself.
 in both its qualification and its preemption arguments, the second Department 
used an unprecedented interpretation of public health. While dictionary definitions 
and legal precedent emphasized the “organized,” “systematic,” and “community” 
nature of public health, the court viewed the term as including any activity that 
affects the safety of any individual member of the public. the court’s overly broad 
definition allowed it to hold that a provision of outpatient care for a single individual 
by a private institution was the functional equivalent of community-based health 
programs for population-level care and surveillance. this is unprecedented in new 
York state case law as well as case law found in other jurisdictions. the court’s 
interpretation also allowed it to circumvent what it recognized as the leading criterion 
supporting a constitutional supremacy Clause challenge—congressional intent. 
instead, the court should have applied the narrow “plain meaning” definition of 
public health used extensively in statutory and case law across the nation, and 
respected the privacy protections Congress intended under hiPaa.
 Both of the court’s arguments set standards that threaten to diminish many of 
the physician-patient privacy protections codified in the hiPaa Privacy Rule. 
Miguel M. may therefore have opened judicial doors for health care providers to 
argue around hiPaa’s privacy goals by using a broadened meaning of public health 
exceptions. Future courts interpreting similar statutory public health qualifications 
should recognize the specific meaning of such language and the clear, narrow 
legislative intent behind it.
86. Miguel M., 882 n.Y.s.2d at 701.
87. Id. at 705.
88. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(c) (emphasis added).
